Political Turbulence by Margetts Helen; John Peter; Hale Scott

Author:Margetts, Helen; John, Peter; Hale, Scott [Margetts, Helen; John, Peter; Hale, Scott]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780691159225
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2015-01-15T07:00:00+00:00

FIGURE 5.1 The experimental interface (social information treatment)

Subjects were endowed with ten tokens at the start of each round and could donate an amount from zero to ten to the collective effort in each round. They were informed that a fixed bonus would be redistributed among all participants in the group if the provision point—corresponding to 60 percent of the maximum amount collectable for that round—was met (the Appendix shows the instructions to participants, including a table of payoffs for each contribution). Subjects could keep any remaining tokens left to them after they had made their contribution to a round. So when the provision point was reached, those who had contributed nothing would receive the maximum payoff of £15.00, while those who had contributed all their ten tokens would receive a payoff of £12.50. If the provision point was not reached, those who had contributed nothing would receive £8.50 and those who contributed the maximum amount would receive £6.00, the lowest possible payoff. Subjects were notified that their payment was made according to the result of one randomly selected round, which is a design that has been shown to impel subjects to treat each round as if it were the only one.24 As the groups formed in each session were different sizes, the provision point was adjusted to meet 60 percent of the maximum amount that could be collected. Each round was planned to last fifty seconds; but to avoid deadline effects, if there was activity during the last five seconds of elapsed time, the round was extended by another five seconds.

Two treatments were implemented in addition to a control condition and all subjects would experience all conditions more than once in the course of their session. In control rounds, the subjects received no social information about the contributions of other subjects, and their own contributions were not visible to other subjects. Under the social information only treatment, subjects were shown real-time information on their computer screens about the total amount raised within their subgroup, and the number of individuals in their group who had already contributed (see Figure 5.1). This information was updated continually in real time throughout each round, as contributions were made; when the round was over, the information was set back to zero. Under the visibility only treatment, subjects were shown real-time information about the amount the individual participants in the room were giving on a screen at the front of the laboratory, showing the desk plan of the room (so contributions were highlighted on the screen as they were made). They were not told, however, which contributions were from participants in their own subgroup, which would have provided them with social information and contaminated our aim to keep the two treatments separate. Under this treatment therefore, all subjects knew that their contribution amounts would be visible to all other subjects as a number against their position in the laboratory and thereby identifiable to themselves. Taken together, these conditions ensured there was no possibility that reputations based on repeated interactions between the same individuals could develop.

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